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Abstract 
Judicial specialisation is a reality worldwide. The New Zealand judiciary must approach 
proposals for further specialisation with caution. Although there are compelling 
arguments in favour of specialisation, there are equally compelling arguments opposing 
specialisation. Therefore, a principled approach must be adopted when assessing the 
merits of further specialisation in any given field of law. The purpose of this paper is to 
develop a set of criteria that transcend the abstract advantages/disadvantages, which can 
be applied generally. These criteria will highlight the nuances inherent in the particular 
field of law that support/oppose specialisation. The purpose of these criteria is to provide a 
tool to a decision-maker to help inform, on a principled basis, whether judicial 
specialisation in any given field of law is appropriate.  
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I Introduction 
It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in 
consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, 
that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of people.1 
The division of labour, since before Smith, has occupied a central place in the heart of 
capitalist dicta. It is a theory rooted in the understanding that wealth is maximised where 
individuals specialise their activity. Smith went so far as to declare that the “difference of 
natural talents in different men, is, in reality… the effect of the division of labour”.2 
Whether it be education, the arts, sport, politics or individual’s chosen professions, every 
facet of our modern lives is influenced to some degree by specialisation. The judiciary is 
no exception.  
This paper is a contribution to the debate surrounding specialisation in the judiciary. The 
debate is not new but, it has been recently rejuvenated by proposals for judicial 
specialisation contained in the Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013. The purpose of this 
paper is to suggest a principled approach to assessing whether further judicial 
specialisation is appropriate in a particular context. This principled approach will be 
grounded in a set of 11 criteria of general application. Each criterion is crafted in order to 
ensure due consideration is given to the vast array of advantages and disadvantages of 
specialisation. First, the criteria will be introduced through the lens of commercial law. 
They will be used to assist in concluding whether New Zealand should have further 
judicial specialisation in commercial law. Secondly, the criteria will be applied to 
administrative law. This will help inform a conclusion on the question of whether there 
should be further specialisation in administrative law in New Zealand. Finally, the 
application of the criteria to both commercial law and administrative law will highlight 
some of the ways in which the criteria respond to certain issues raised by the particular 
fields of law. These responses will help form the basis for suggesting two improvements 
that can be made to the criteria as a whole.  
                                            
1 Adam Smith “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (1776) at 22. 
2 Smith, above n 1 at 40. 
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A principled approach to the question of further judicial specialisation is necessary because 
increased specialisation in the law and courts is a reality worldwide.3 Therefore, it has 
become a pressing issue for the New Zealand judicial system to decide the extent to which 
the New Zealand courts should specialise. Currently, the New Zealand legislature is 
considering whether there should be judicial specialisation in the High Court. The 
Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013, as reported back from the Justice and Electoral 
Committee, proposes to establish a commercial panel of judges to hear commercial cases 
in the High Court.4 The debate on judicial specialisation is not new. In 2004 the Law 
Commission recommended that a specialist list of commercial judges be set up to hear 
commercial cases in the High Court.5 Strong submissions were received by the Law 
Commission for and against proposals for specialisation in the judiciary.6 The Commission 
has recognised that it has been a matter of “great controversy”, which has sparked sharp 
debate in New Zealand over the past decade.7 
Calls for judicial specialisation have not been limited to the commercial context. The 
recent Law Commission Issues Paper also considered further specialisation in other areas 
of law in the future.8 It asserts that “if a (commercial) panel framework were set up, it 
would be easier to include other specialties at a later date”.9 The following Law 
Commission Report recommended that the commercial panel be a “pilot project as to how 
a panel system will best work in New Zealand.”10 The Commission and submitters have 
mentioned administrative law, intellectual property law, employment law, environmental 
law and tax law as further potential areas of specialisation in the future.11 Clause 18 of the 
                                            
3 New Zealand Bar Association “Review of the Judicature Act 1908 – Towards a Consolidated Courts 
Act” at [38]. 
4 Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013, cl 18. 
5 Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals (NZLC R 
85, 2004) at 267. 
6 Submitters for High Court Specialisation: Buddle Findlay, New Zealand Bar Association and New 
Zealand Law Society. Submitters against: Chief Justice, Senior Courts Judges and Jack Hodder QC.    
7 Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act (NZLC R126, 2012) at 
10.1. 
8 Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a consolidated Courts Act (NZLC IP29, 
2012) at 73. 
9 Law Commission, above n 8, at 73. 
10 Law Commission, above n 7, at 13 and 115. 
11 Law Commission, above n 7 at 110; Law Commission, above n 8, at 73. 
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Judicature Modernisation Bill provides for the establishment of a “commercial panel” and 
“other panels” of High Court judges.12 
A Definition of “judicial specialisation”  
Before proceeding to set out the various criteria, this paper must first define judicial 
specialisation. The term “judicial specialisation” is ambiguous. For instance the limitation 
of a court’s jurisdiction to one geographical area could qualify as a form of judicial 
specialisation. However, for the purpose of this study, “judicial specialisation” refers to 
subject matter specialisation of a court. It describes specialist courts that have limited and 
frequently exclusive jurisdiction in one or more specific fields of the law.13 The narrowly 
focused jurisdiction of that court is where all cases that fall within that jurisdiction are 
channelled.14  Judges who serve on the bench of specialist courts are widely considered 
experts in the particular fields of law that fall within the court’s jurisdiction. The New 
Zealand Employment Court is an illustration of judicial specialisation. It is a specialist 
industrial relations court with limited jurisdiction to hear all matters relating to 
employment disputes.15  
While this paper will focus on judicial specialisation at the appellate court level, it is 
important to comment on judicial specialisation in tribunals. Each tribunal in New Zealand 
is established by legislation that sets out the tribunal’s functions, powers and extent of 
authority. They are expert forums of first instance where parties can be heard and have 
disputes resolved over facts and/or law. Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to assess further specialisation at the tribunal level and to do so would be a research paper 
in itself. A brief list of relevant reading and research on the subject matter of specialisation 
at the tribunal level is provided in the footnote below.16 
                                            
12 Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 as reported back from the Justice and Electoral Committee, clause 
18 (1) and (3); as indicated by Jack Hodder QC “The Judicature Modernisation Bill – (Personal) 
Submission on Three Points” (2014) at [7]. 
13 Markus B. Zimmer “Overview of Specialist Courts” (2009) 10 IJFCA 1 at 2. 
14 At 2. 
15 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 187.  
16 Law Commission, “Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals” 
(NZLC R85, 2004); Cane, P “Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication” (Oxford, United Kingdom, 
2009); Law Commission Tribunal Reform (NZLC SP20, 2008); Law Commission Tribunals in New 
Zealand (NZLC IP6, 2008); Spiller, P “The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand” (2nd ed, Brookers, 
2003); Dr. W. John Hopkins “Order from Chaos? Tribunal Reform in New Zealand” (2007, Paper, 
University of Canterbury); Roger P.Alford “The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: 
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II The criteria 
The proceeding part of this paper will introduce a set of 11 criteria of general application, 
which can be used as a tool to assist in answering the question of whether further judicial 
specialisation in a particular field of law is necessary. The criteria will be introduced in the 
context of, and applied to, the question of further specialisation in commercial law. Each 
criterion will be introduced individually, applied to commercial law and then substantiated 
by the various advantages and disadvantages of specialisation that inform that criterion. 
The 11 criteria require an assessment of the degree to which each factor is present in the 
particular field of law. Broadly the criteria are the degree to which the area of law:  
1. deals with questions of discretion, law or fact; 
2. is considered complex; 
3. is isolated; 
4. is repetitious; 
5. raises matters of controversy; 
6. fosters clannishness; 
7. requires a peculiar importance of consistency; 
8. is dynamic; 
9. creates a high case volume/demand; 
10. requires a special need for prompt resolutions; and  
11. requires special court procedures. 
Criterion 1 requires an assessment of the extent to which a decision-maker adjudicating a 
dispute in that particular field of law will deal substantially with questions of discretion, 
law or fact. Questions of discretion will favour specialisation and will be present where the 
decision maker must apply broadly worded statutory provisions or decide a question that 
                                                                                                                                    
International Adjudication in Ascendance” (2000, Scholarly Works, Notre Dame Law School); Laurence 
Baum “Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases” (2010) 59 DLJ 8. 
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requires a high degree of value judgment. Legal questions oppose specialisation and focus 
on the application of the law and legal principles. Whereas, factual decisions favour 
specialisation and require a decision maker to conclude on the application of facts to law. 
Criterion 2 also favours specialisation and requires an assessment of how technically 
complicated the area of law is. Criterion 3 favours specialisation and is concerned with 
how easy it is to isolate the jurisdiction of a particular field of law. Criterion 4 supports 
specialisation and is an analysis of how repetitive it is for an adjudicator practicing within 
that field of law. Criterion 5 disfavours specialisation and concerns itself with the degree 
to which the field of law presents decisions of public controversy. Criterion 6 opposes 
specialisation and refers to the close/closed working relationship that the lawyers, 
government officials and expert witnesses have with one another. Criterion 7 supports 
specialisation and asks whether the particular field of law has a peculiar importance of 
consistency relative to other fields of law. Criterion 8 supports specialisation and describes 
an area of law that has a rapidly changing subject matter or legal framework. Criterion 9 
supports specialisation where there is a high degree of case volume/demand sufficient to 
justify specialisation. Criterion 10 supports specialisation where the area of law requires a 
special need for a prompt resolution of the cases adjudicated. Finally, criterion 11 supports 
specialisation where the area of law requires special court procedures in order to 
effectively adjudicate disputes.  
Numerous authors have analysed the various advantages and disadvantages of judicial 
specialisation and then, on balance, concluded whether specialisation is a “good” thing.17 
In my view, these conclusions are neither helpful nor practical to anyone that is faced with 
the decision of whether further specialisation is necessary in a particular context. This is 
because the strengths and weaknesses of judicial specialisation are greater in some areas of 
law than they are in others.18 What is helpful is a standard by which can be applied 
contextually to judge whether judicial specialisation is appropriate. 
                                            
17 Markus Zimmer, above n 13, at 4; Rochelle C.Dreyfuss “Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized 
Courts in Resolving Business Disputes” [1995] 61 Brooklyn Law Review 1 at 20; Lawrence Baum 
“Probing the effects of judicial specialization” (2009) 58 DLJ 167 at 1676; Rifkind S, “A special court for 
Patent Litigation? The danger of a specialized judiciary” (1951) American Bar Association Journal at 
425. 
18 Stephen Legomsky “Specialized Justice : Courts, Administrative Tribunals, and Cross-National Theory 
of Specialization” (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) at 20. 
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The following criteria are based on Stephen Legomsky’s criteria developed in 1987.19 
However, there are considerations that Legomsky could not have contemplated in 1987, 
which are now important considerations to any decision maker faced with the question of 
further specialisation. Accordingly, the criteria have been amended and adapted to reflect 
considerations applicable to the modern day New Zealand judicial system. Many of these 
considerations are manifested in New Zealand’s recent Law Commission Report on the 
judiciary.20  
Importantly, this paper has not included the stage of litigation as a criterion. This is 
because specialisation is most preferable at the initial decision making level and least 
preferable at the appellate level. It is at the trial level where the advantages of 
specialisation are the strongest. Litigants and lawyers invest most time and resources at 
trial level necessitating efficiency. Additionally, most fact finding is conducted at first 
instance necessitating expertise. It has been suggested that specialist judges at pre-trial will 
preside over case processing “that is faster, less costly (in both judicial and attorney time), 
and more frequently correct.”21 Accordingly, matters on appeal may not require the same 
degree of specialisation as was required at the original hearing because appeals often 
concern more general principles of law.22  The generalist appellate review should provide a 
check on the disadvantages of specialisation and ultimately help protect unity of the law. 
III The criteria in the context of commercial law 
New Zealand currently has no commercial specialist court at the District Court level or 
above. The field of commercial law has been chosen because it has been the subject of 
sharp debate surrounding the proposals set out in the Judicature Modernisation Bill. There 
is also a global trend towards jurisdictions effecting further judicial specialisation in 
commercial law. Namely, the United Kingdom and Australia each have courts at the 
District Court level or above that either exclusively hear commercial cases or have 
specialised judges that get assigned to commercial cases.  
New Zealand has a limited form of commercial judicial specialisation. It does not have a 
commercial specialist court. Most commercial disputes will be heard in either the District 
                                            
19 Legomsky, above n 18, at 20. 
20 Law Commission, above n 8, at 7.26. 
21 Jeffrey Stempel “Two cheers for specialization” [1995] 68 Brooklyn Law Review 67 at 113. 
22 Law Commission, above n 5, at 263. 
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Court or the High Court, which are courts of general jurisdiction. The High Court has 
limited commercial specialisation in the form of the commercial list. The commercial list is 
comprised of High Court judges who are considered specialists23 and it is intended to speed 
up the pre-trial proceedings relating to eligible matters.24 Members of the list are 
empowered to give “such directions as it thinks fit for the speedy and inexpensive 
determination of the real questions between the parties.”25 However, the list only deals 
with pre-trial matters and once the case is ready for hearing then it will be transferred back 
into the High Court general list.26 Additionally, there are two Tribunals that specialise in 
hearing specific commercial disputes at first instance. They are the Taxation Review 
Authority and the Copyright Tribunal, both of which are appealed to courts of general 
jurisdiction.  
The question of specialisation in the commercial context has been the subject of recent 
debate in New Zealand. The Law Commission has considered this question in its issues 
paper and report reviewing the Judicature Act 1908.27 It considered arguments for and 
against specialisation in the High Court generally and specifically addressed the question 
of specialisation in the commercial context. It recommended that there should be a 
commercial panel of judges established the High Court. The jurisdiction of the court was 
recommended to be similar to the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court in London, but 
with the addition of intellectual property.28 Accordingly, the Judicature Modernisation Bill 
proposes to establish a commercial panel and is currently awaiting its third reading. 
There is a global trend toward specialisation in the commercial courts. The United 
Kingdom has two separate divisions of the High Court called the Queen’s Bench Division 
and the Chancery Division. There are specialist courts of the Queen’s Bench Division, 
which include: the Technology and Construction Court; the Commercial Court; and the 
                                            
23 Courts of New Zealand “Commercial List” < www.courtsofnz.govt.nz >. 
24 Law Commission, above n 8, at 7.12. 
25 Judicature Act 1908, s 24D. 
26 Law Commission, above n 8, at 7.4. 
27 Law Commission, above n 8; Law Commission, above n 7. 
28 Law Commission, above n 7. The jurisdiction of the London Commercial Court is defined as: “Any 
claim arising out of the transactions of trade and commerce and includes any claim relating to - a business 
document or contract; the export or import of goods; the carriage of goods by land, sea, air or pipeline; 
the exploitation of oil and gas reserves or other natural resources; insurance and reinsurance; banking and 
financial services; the operation of markets and exchanges; the purchase and sale of commodities; the 
construction of ships; business agency; and arbitration. See Civil Procedure Rules (UK), r 58.2(2). 
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Admiralty Court. The Chancery division also has specialist courts in the Patent’s Court and 
the Companies Court, which primarily deal with intellectual property and company law 
matters respectively. Australia has a similar form of commercial specialisation as is 
proposed by the New Zealand Law Commission. Australia has established a panel system 
in its superior trial courts which comprise of lists of judges specialised in dealing with 
certain fields of law.29 The Supreme Courts of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland 
each operate lists that, to varying degrees, specialise in commercial law.30 The Federal 
Court of Australia operates a full docket system where each case is allocated to the docket 
of a specific judge who will manage the case right through to disposition. There is a 
commercial specialist list in the Federal Court that judges can opt into and serve for three 
years at a time.31  
It is within this commercial context that this paper will introduce the 11 criteria. Each 
criterion will be introduced in abstract and then applied to commercial law. The advantages 
and disadvantages that prop up each criterion will also be discussed in order to substantiate 
the criterion’s existence. 
A Criterion 1: Discretionary, legal or factual decisions 
The first criterion that could be deployed when considering further specialisation in any 
given area of law is to consider the frequency at which the particular area of law presents 
questions of discretion, law or fact.32 A case for specialisation can be made stronger where 
the area involves a large degree of discretionary decision making. Conversely, the 
existence of a high degree of legal questions can weigh against judicial specialisation.33 
Finally, a case for specialisation may be made stronger where the decision involves 
questions of fact.34 In the writer’s view, the involvement of factual questions favouring 
specialisation is greatly reduced in our modern legal system as opposed to when Legomsky 
originally developed his criteria.  
                                            
29 Law Commission, above n 8, at 7.47. 
30 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, r 45.1. 
31 Law Commission, above n 8, at 7.54. 
32 Stephen Legomsky, above n 18, at 22. 
33 Stephen Legomsky, above n 18, at 22 – 23.  
34 Stephen Legomsky, above n 18, at 23. 
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1 Discretionary decision making 
Discretionary decision making will generally favour specialisation. Discretionary decision 
making encompasses decisions of the court where there are a range of “correct” answers 
available to it. These can be decisions that must apply broadly worded statutory provisions 
or decisions that require a high degree of value judgments.  
Discretionary decision making provides the best opportunity for the advantages of 
specialisation to operate because: it relies on a deep understanding of the policy objectives 
behind that area of law;35 there is greater scope for the misapplication of the law;36 and 
there is a greater need of cohesion because of the inherent uncertainty in broadly worded 
legislative provisions.37 Each of these advantages stem from the idea that specialisation 
improves consistency. Consistency refers to the extent to which the court reaches the same 
result in equivalent cases.38  Specialist courts are able to produce more consistent decisions 
because they have a greater familiarity with the previous case law within their jurisdiction. 
There is also a greater quantity of expert judges who operate in a narrow field, enhancing 
their ability to discuss current and past decisions and refine their approaches.39 Consistency 
improves the quality of decision-making because it ensures that equivalently situated 
litigants are treated alike.40 Consistency in litigation is important because it reduces 
uncertainty and increases the predictability of case outcomes.41 Specialised expert judges 
with vast experience in a particular area are better positioned to exercise their discretion in 
a way that achieves these objectives.42  
Legomsky posits that the discretionary nature of decision making may also oppose 
specialisation in a limited number of circumstances.43 This is influenced by the 
disadvantage of concentrating policy decision making power on a small group of people is 
                                            
35 Stephen Legomsky, above n 18, at 22. 
36 Markus Zimmer, above n 13, at 5. 
37 Markus Zimmer, above n 13, at 5.  
38 Rochelle Dreyfuss “Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business 
Disputes” [1995] 61 Brooklyn Law Review 1 at 12. 
39 Lawrence Baum “Probing the effects of judicial specialisation” (2009) 58 DLJ 1673 at 1676. 
40 Rochelle Dreyfuss, above n 38, at 13. 
41 Joint project between the International Intellectual Property Institute and the United States Patent 
Trademark Office “Study on Specialised Intellectual Property Courts” (25 January 2012) at 6. 
42 Stephen Legomsky, above n 18, at 23. 
43 Stephen Legomsky, above n 18, at 23. 
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more pronounced when the specialist court is dealing with discretionary decisions.44 This 
is because specialisation can cause the judiciary to become insular in its focus. 45 
Accordingly, there is a risk of apparent or actual bias on behalf of the specialist court. This 
effect can be illustrated by the influence a specialised bar can exert over shaping judicial 
thinking, and risk compromising the judiciary’s neutrality.  If a court specialises in tax 
cases, then its judges will interact primarily (if not exclusively) with members of the bar 
who specialise in tax work. That specialised bar will have greater opportunity to influence 
the judicial decision making in tax law than they would if they had to litigate their cases in 
front of generalist judges.46 The risk of apparent bias is magnified where the specialist 
court is regularly engaging in discretionary decision making. 
2 Legal decision making 
On the other hand, the prevalence of questions of law will disfavour specialisation. 
Questions of law must be answered by the application of legal principles and interpretation 
of the law. Legal questions are unsupportive of specialisation because specialisation can 
lead to insularity within the specialist court, which can inhibit the development of the law 
and legal thought in a unified manner. Zimmer argues that specialist courts leave little 
room for the “cross-pollination that fosters, tests, refines, and improves new ideas and 
novel approaches in interpreting and applying the law”.47 Further, an American Judge 
warned that specialisation “immunizes [the court] against the refreshments of new ideas, 
suggestions, adjustments and compromises which constitute the very tissue of any living 
system in law”.48 Each discipline of law, whether it be torts, contract, tax or intellectual 
property, does not stand isolated from one another. They all form building blocks for the 
civil jurisdiction of the courts. Specialist judges may lose sight of how their smaller world 
fits into the larger one.49 In recognition of this argument, the New Zealand Law 
                                            
44 Stephen Legomsky, above n 18, at 23. 
45 Anthony Downs “Inside Bureaucracy” (Chicago, Real Estate Research Corporation, 1964) at 43.  
46 Markus Zimmer, above n 13, at 4. 
47 Markus Zimmer, above n 13, at 3. 
48 Rifkind S, “A special court for Patent Litigation? The danger of a specialized judiciary” (1951) 
American Bar Association Journal at 425. 
49 Diane Wood “Generalist Judges in a Specialized World” (1997) 50 SMU Law Review 1755 at 1767. 
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Commission cautions that if the generalist jurisdiction of the High Court is eroded too 
much then it risks “losing flexibility and may become fragmented”.50   
The disadvantage of insularity can also lead to monopolies within specialist areas of law. 
Commentators warn against judicial specialisation because it can create a “club culture”51 
where the views of a small number of judges dominate a particular area of law.52 A panel 
of judges that becomes too small can promote matching mythology of expertise among the 
profession.53 As a result, this can encourage monopolies and potentially constrain 
jurisprudence.54 Monopolies in this context are disadvantageous for two reasons. First, they 
reduce diversity of ideas and approaches to problem solving.55 Secondly, it brings about a 
greater concentration of judicial power resting on individual judges.56 The Ministry of 
Justice analysed the potential effect of judicial specialisation and agreed that “a relatively 
small cohort of judges being responsible for certain case types may… harm more diverse 
development of the common law”.57  
The Senior Courts judges, in submitting to the Law Commission, argue that judicial 
specialisation would fragment the High Court’s jurisdiction and would “impoverish the 
development and application of the common law”.58 Those opposed to further 
specialisation argue that judges operating in a generalist jurisdiction foster unity of law.59 
                                            
50 Law Commission, above n 8, at 7.25. 
51 Australian Law Reform Commission Managing justice: a review of the federal justice system (report 
89, 1999) at 453. 
52 Law Commission, above n 8, at 7.26. 
53 Diane Wood, above n 49, at 1767. 
54 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 51, at 453. 
55 Richard Posner “Will the Federal Courts of Appeals survive until 1984? An essay on delegation and 
specialisation of the judicial function” (1983) 56 Cal. L. Rev. 761 at 785. 
56 Posner, at 786. 
57 Ministry of Justice Judicial Specialisation in the High Court (Regulatory Impact Analysis, August 
2014) at <www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/r/regulatory-impact-statement>. 
58 Law Commission, above n 7, at 10.27. 
59 Law Commission, above n 7, at 10.27; Jack Hodder QC “The Judicature Modernisation Bill – 
(Personal) Submission on Three Points” (20 February 2014) at [7]; Sir Rabinder Singh “The Unity of 
Law – Or the Dangers of Over-Specialisation (2013, Society of Legal Scholars Centenary Lecture, 
University of Bermingham). 
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Sir Rabinder Singh illustrates this point with a story about three men who were asked to 
describe an elephant:60 
The first man was able to touch only the side of the elephant and said that an elephant is 
shaped like a wall. The second man could only touch a leg and said that an elephant was 
like a pillar. The third man could only handle the tail and said that the elephant was like 
a rope.  
The analogy is clear: judges need to have a general knowledge of the context of the law in 
order to ensure the overall unity of the law.61 The disadvantage of judicial specialisation 
creating insularity is therefore enhanced where the court regularly deals with questions of 
law. 
The modern legal environment requires this aspect of the criterion to be reconsidered. 
Questions of law should disfavour specialisation to a greater extent now than they did in 
1990 when Legomsky developed this criterion. This is a result of a plethora of minute 
areas of law that are being established or growing in importance.62 As each of these areas 
grow and develop new legal doctrine, the risk of the law developing with disunity will 
become greater than it was in 1990.  
3 Factual decision making 
Legomsky argues that the prevalence of factual questions will favour specialisation. 
Factual decision making often involves the judge assessing the credibility of witnesses and 
weighing up conflicting evidence produced by expert witnesses.63 A specialist court is 
better positioned to assess questions of fact because they will have greater expertise in that 
specific area of law, which can produce more accurate decision making. Judicial expertise 
produces more accurate decision-making because a specialist judge, in general, is going to 
be more familiar with their specialist area of law than a generalist judge. It cannot be 
expected of a generalist judge to have close familiarity with particular facets of the law 
                                            
60 Sir Rabinder Singh “The Unity of Law – Or the Dangers of Over-Specialisation (2013, Society of 
Legal Scholars Centenary Lecture, University of Bermingham). 
61 Ibid. 
62 For example; intellectual property law, admiralty law, entertainment law, environmental law and 
immigration law. 
63 Stephen Legomsky, above n 18, at 23. 
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when they are otherwise expected to be “jacks of all trades”.64 The Law Commission 
recognises that few lawyers could expect to cover a whole range of legal work from 
criminal jury trials to intellectual property disputes, “let alone in the same week or even 
day”.65 Yet, this is what we expect of generalist judges. 66 Accuracy is measured by 
whether a decision arrives at an objectively “correct” result.67  In most cases this requires 
an assessment of whether the facts reflect the decision arrived at by the court. Specialist 
judges can produce more accurate decisions through “the right questions being asked, thus 
reducing the likelihood of further appeal.”68 Judicial specialisation in cases where there is a 
prevalence of factual decision making therefore has the advantage of allowing the 
adjudicators to be better positioned to assess the strength of complex facts and better 
understand briefs of evidence from expert witnesses.69  
This aspect of the first criterion should carry less weight today than it did in 1987. Since 
1987, there has been significant reform to the law of evidence.70 One purpose of the reform 
was to avoid unnecessary complexity and assist the decision maker in making findings of 
fact.71 In particular, the reforms assisted the decision maker in answering questions of fact 
presented by expert witnesses.72 Prior to the reforms, the Law Commission commented 
that the laws of evidence made questions of fact complex, uncertain, costly and slow.73 
These reforms have assisted in enabling generalist judges to better answer questions of fact 
and reduce the need for specialist judges where the area of law frequently presents 
questions of fact.  
                                            
64 Sir Ian Barker QC, “Is Australia and New Zealand’s IP litigation product internationally competitive?” 
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B Discretionary, legal or factual decisions applied to commercial law 
In applying the first criterion to commercial law, it is certain that some areas of 
commercial law are highly discretionary. These areas include taxation and intellectual 
property. However, legal decision-making is also prevalent in commercial law. This is 
because of the underlying principle of certainty present in the policy behind commercial 
legislation. Taxation and intellectual property are also areas of commercial law that include 
a high degree of factual decision-making. 
The area of tax can be highly discretionary. The application of the general anti-avoidance 
provision requires wide judicial discretion. The general anti-avoidance provision provides 
that a “tax avoidance arrangement is void as against the Commissioner for income tax 
purposes”.74 A tax avoidance arrangement has been defined as an arrangement that avoids 
tax, which leaves the courts with a large degree of uncertainty as to how this provision 
should be applied.75 The test has been criticised as a “sniff test” allowing judges to assess 
and weigh up a number of factors that “contribute to the foul smell of the transaction”.76 
Because avoidance cases comprise a high number of overall tax cases litigated,77 it is 
imperative that judges hearing these cases have a sound understanding of the underlying 
policy objectives of tax law when exercising this discretion. In the area of intellectual 
property, Glazebrook J argues that discretion and policy “is inherently bound up in judicial 
decision-making relating to patents”.78 Dreyfuss discusses the “ongoing balancing act” that 
jurists must engage in when ensuring that a patent system creates incentives to innovate 
while managing anti-competitive behaviour.79 
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Legal decision-making comprises a lot of commercial litigation due to the inherent 
importance of certainty. This principle informs a large degree of commercial legislation, 
which is designed to provide commerce with confidence in the legal outcomes of decisions 
that affect investment. For example, the Personal Property Securities Act 1999 governs the 
granting of security interests over personal property. It establishes a uniform set of legal 
rules that relate to the enforcement of interests in personal property that secure the payment 
of money to creditors.80 These rules are designed to limit discretion in an effort to bring 
more “clarity, certainty and predictability into the securities system”.81 Another example is 
the Insolvency (Cross-border) Act 2006, which was enacted to implement a framework for 
the courts to deal with cross-border insolvency proceedings.82 The Act adopts the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on cross-
border insolvency, which limits the courts discretion not to recognise proceedings as a 
foreign proceeding.83 The preamble states that an objective of the Act is to promote greater 
legal certainty for trade and investment.84 
Factual decision-making is an important function of a judge in commercial disputes. A 
focus on taxation disputes illustrates this point. As mentioned above, the general anti-
avoidance provision comprises a significant number of tax disputes.85 Elmiger v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue86 explores the question of avoidance with President 
North declaring that the presence of avoidance is “ultimately a question of fact”.87 Factual 
decision-making is also important in intellectual property given the need for judges to be 
called upon to assess scientific and technological evidence.88 These decisions will be 
informed by an assessment of conflicting evidence presented by expert witnesses.  
In applying this criterion to commercial law, it is evident that taxation and intellectual 
property law decisions favour specialisation because they both involve discretionary 
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factual decision-making. However, other areas of commercial law such as insolvency law 
and property law favour generalist adjudication due to the legal nature of decision making.  
C Criterion 2: Complexity 
Secondly, a high level of complexity traditionally favours specialisation.89 Complexity can 
be present for different reasons. An area of law can be complex because of a large statutory 
scheme,90 technical subject matter91 or a technical regulatory framework92. Complexity 
favours specialisation because specialist judges will be more familiar with the overall 
scheme of the area enabling them to apply a contextual approach to statutory interpretation 
and the application of the law.93  
Complexity also favours specialisation because a specialised judiciary is more efficient at 
adjudicating technically complex subject matter.94 In 1981, when the United States was 
faced with the problem of a “litigation explosion” and there were limited judges to handle 
the increased workload, Professor Jordan answered the question of how to make the best 
use of a scarce commodity. He provided a typical economic answer: “division of labour 
through specialisation of the court system”.95  
One major contributor to improved efficiency in adjudicating technically complicated 
subject matter is the efficiency of judges themselves. The argument is that judges’ 
specialist experience can cut down hearing time and costs for litigants.96 Former Chief 
Justice of the Australian Federal Court comments that “no doubt we can all work out the 
right result if we had time, but where a decision in a technical area has to be made on the 
spot… it is best to have a judge who can give the case the immediate, most instinctive, 
attention that it requires.”97 
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Judicial specialisation improves a judge’s efficiency because repeating similar tasks may 
allow a judge to develop routines and gives them greater familiarity with the relevant tasks. 
On this view, judges who are more familiar with an area of law will hear both the case and 
deliver the judgment more quickly.98 Chief Judge of the American patent law specialist 
court analogised: “if I am doing brain surgery every day, day in and out, chances are very 
good that I will do your brain surgery much quicker than someone who does brain surgery 
once every couple of years”.99 Moreover, judges in a specialist court are responsible for 
remaining current in fewer areas of law. Therefore, their research efficiency is enhanced.100 
The efficiency of specialised judges can be contrasted with the inefficiencies of generalist 
judges. Barristers who appear before a generalist judge, particularly in complicated fields 
of law, will detail to excess all relevant and useful information about the application of the 
law on record.101 There are two reasons why the barrister must do this. First, they may 
need to educate the generalist judge in the particular area of law as a result of the judge 
being marginally familiar with the subject matter. Secondly, they disclose all of the law in 
anticipation of appeal in case the judge fails to grasp the elements of the law that compel 
the resolution.102 The high cost of litigation reflects the extensive work required by 
barristers and can impact on public access to the courts because of the expense.103 
In a complex area of law, specialisation can be advantageous because it enhances the 
development of the law. This is not only because judicial specialisation can produce better 
quality decisions (see above) but also because it encourages disputes to be brought to 
court. Supporters of specialisation argue that parties will choose other dispute resolution 
procedures where they perceive that litigation will prove too lengthy, costly and 
uncertain.104 In New Zealand’s commercial context, there is anecdotal evidence that 
suggests litigants are increasingly choosing alternative dispute resolution (i.e. commercial 
                                            
98 Law Commission, above n 8, at 7.24. 
99 Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals Hearings before Subcommittee 
on Courts (1981) 97th Congress 42-43. 
100 Markus Zimmer, above n 13, at 2. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Annette Marfording “Civil Litigation in New South Wales: Empirical and Analytical Comparisons 
with Germany” (2010) (University of New South Wales research paper, July 15) at 157. 
103 Markus Zimmer, above n 13, at 2. 
104 New Zealand Law Society “Review of the Judicature Act 1908 – Towards a consolidated Courts Act” 
(4 May 2012); Bell Gully “Bell Gully submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee – Judicature 
Modernisation Bill” (2014) at [5]. 
  23 
arbitration) over litigating their case in court.105 This diminishes the court’s ability to 
establish binding and persuasive common law decisions.106 In submitting support for 
specialisation, the New Zealand Law Society expressed concern about the prospect, under 
a generalist jurisdiction, of the law not being developed as fully as it might be due to a 
decline in commercial cases.107 
Conversely, it could be argued that complexity is less favourable of specialisation than it 
was in 1987 for three reasons. First, there have been significant developments to online 
legal databases that enable individuals in the legal profession to undertake vast legal 
research faster and easier. Secondly, the internet has made it easier for generalist judges to 
quickly come to grips with the basics of complex areas of science, technology, medicine 
and engineering. Thirdly, barristers who appear before judges are specialising in certain 
fields of law and it is their responsibility to bring the judge up to speed on complex issues 
relating to their case. In support of this proposition, Lord Woolf affirms in a letter to the 
president of the United Kingdom Law Commission that there is a trend of barristers 
becoming more specialised.108 Furthermore, Jack Hodder QC submits that it is counsel’s 
responsibility to “provide all relevant background and context for the trial judge in terms 
understandable to an intelligent and experienced lawyer”.109 On the other hand, this 
criterion could be more compelling in the modern legal system than it was 20 years ago 
because of the vast developments in areas of law that interact with science, technology, 
medicine and engineering. This argument would require further judicial specialisation 
because these developments have made areas of law such as intellectual property 
challenging. 
It could also be argued that complexity should actually disfavour specialisation. There is a 
risk that judicial specialisation will exasperate the incomprehensibility and insularity of 
areas of law that are already inherently complex. Chief Judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals, Judge Diane Wood, advocates for the retention of generalists judges. She insists 
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that generalists judges “cannot become technocrats” and hide behind specialised 
vocabulary and “insider” concerns.110 She regards the need to explain complex concepts to 
generalist judges as a positive process. This is because it forces the bar to “demystify” the 
law and make it comprehensible.111 Forcing specialist advocates to argue before generalist 
judges helps to ensure that the law will remain intelligible.112 This can enhance the 
accountability of the courts to society.  
D Complexity applied to commercial law 
Complexity is often cited as a feature of commercial law that favours specialisation. The 
Law Commission acknowledged submitters that argued for specialisation in commercial 
law given the increasing complexity of civil litigation.113 The field of commercial law is 
complex for several reasons. First, many of the areas of commercial law, such as: taxation; 
insolvency; and company law, operate within large statutory schemes. Secondly, the 
subject matter of intellectual property, taxation and insolvency law is often considered 
complex.  
Many of the statutory schemes governing commercial law in New Zealand are large and 
complicated. In taxation law, Professor Prebble describes tax law as “inherently 
complex”.114 One reason why tax law is inherently complex is “through the expression 
(drafting) of tax laws”.115 It has been a priority of Rewrite Advisory Panel to simplify the 
Income Tax Act on a number of occasions to varying degrees of success.116 However, any 
judge looking to apply the provisions of the Income Tax Act 2007 still has to wrestle with 
over 1,500 pages of legislation. The Insolvency Act 2006 and the Companies Act 1993 
have 457 sections and 401 sections respectively, which have been described by the 
Commerce Commission as “increasingly complex”.117 
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The subject matter of commercial law disputes is complex. Intellectual property is often 
cited as one of the more complex areas of commercial law. The International Intellectual 
Property Institute recommends specialist courts for intellectual property because “the laws 
that govern [intellectual property] are complex, and the technologies that are protected by 
those laws can be even more complex”.118 The Law Commission considers it ambitious to 
expect High Court judges to be able to cover the intricacies of intellectual property law on 
top of the work they conduct as generalist judges due to intellectual property’s 
complexity.119 Areas of taxation have been described as “an intellectual minefield in which 
principles are elusive and analogies treacherous”.120 Lord Greene went so far as to say that 
in certain decisions involving tax law: 121 
“…it is almost true to say that the spin of a coin would decide the matter almost as 
satisfactorily as an attempt to find reasons.” 
In the context of insolvency law, the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants 
submits that further regulation of the insolvency sector is needed because insolvency law 
has become increasingly complex and specialised. It considers that this requires insolvency 
practitioners to have a greater range of expertise than has historically been the case.122 
E Criterion 3: Isolation  
The ability to isolate the jurisdiction of a specialised court will favour specialisation.123 
Zimmer opines that the judges of a specialised court should have complete authority over 
the field of law and subject matter that is placed within their jurisdiction.124 This requires 
the area of law to be discrete in the sense that it does not involve the consideration of legal 
issues from other areas of law. It is argued that, as a general rule, if the specialist 
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jurisdiction cannot be wholly transferred to the specialist court, then it should be left with 
the generalist courts.125 
This criterion is informed by the disadvantage that specialisation can create an incentive to 
encourage forum shopping and reduce the efficiency of the legal system as a whole. As 
case law becomes more certain, litigants should be able to predict the result of their case 
more readily.126 If a litigant knows that they will lose a case they could attempt to litigate 
jurisdictional boundaries between specialist courts.127 This is an unnecessary cost to the 
judicial system. If the specialist jurisdictional boundaries are unclear then this will lead to 
greater litigation. On the other hand, if the courts adopt “bright line” rules clarifying 
boundaries, then this could lead to arbitrariness and open the door for manipulation by 
litigants.128 The encouragement of forum shopping is minimised if the jurisdiction can be 
isolated.129 Moreover, where the subject matter frequently requires the litigation of a 
variety of legal issues from other areas of law, the advantage of expertise is substantially 
minimised.   
F Isolation applied to commercial law 
The jurisdiction of commercial law is far reaching and not easily isolated. There will be 
particular types of cases that will certainly fall into the jurisdiction of a commercial court. 
However, there will also be cases on the fringe of the court’s jurisdiction that will be at risk 
of enabling forum shopping. Moreover, these cases will likely involve the consideration of 
legal issues from a variety of other areas of law, which calls into question whether the 
advantages of specialisation will be as strong as submitters may suggest. 
It is hard to define what the jurisdiction would be for a commercial court. However, the 
New Zealand Law Commission has proposed that the jurisdiction of cases that would 
eligible to be heard by a member of a commercial panel would be similar to the jurisdiction 
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of the Commercial Court in London.130 The jurisdiction of the Commercial Court in 
London is defined as: 
… any claim arising out of the transactions of trade and commerce and includes any 
claim relating to- 
a.) a business document or contract; 
b.) the export or import of goods; 
c.) the carriage of goods by land, sea, air or pipeline; 
d.) the exploitation of oil and gas reserves or other natural resources; 
e.) insurance and reinsurance; 
f.) banking and financial services; 
g.) the operation of markets and exchanges; 
h.) the purchase and sale of commodities; 
i.) the construction of ships; 
j.) business agency; and 
k.) arbitration. 
The Law Commission has also recommended that intellectual property be added to this 
list.131 
It is clear that this jurisdiction is broad. There will be numerous instances where claims 
that arise under these types of disputes will require reference to areas of law that are 
outside of commercial law. In fact, in the author’s view, there are not many areas of law 
that could be excluded from this jurisdiction. A judge operating within this commercial 
jurisdiction could have to deal with issues of tort law, contract law, resource management 
law, private international law, maritime law and, possibly, criminal law.  
                                            
130 Law Commission, above n 8, at 10.12. 
131 At 10.68. Note the Judicature Modernisation Bill does not define the jurisdiction of the commercial 
list, but leaves it open to the Chief High Court Judge to do so. See Clause 18 of the Bill. 
  28 
While a broad jurisdiction tends to disfavour specialisation, it does also reduce some of the 
disadvantages of specialisation. Reference to other areas of law will ensure that 
commercial law avoids duplication of legal thought and prevents inconsistencies arising.132 
It also ensures that commercial law benefits from the cross pollination of ideas from all of 
the other areas of law that must be canvassed in order to resolve a commercial dispute.   
G Criterion 4: Degree of repetition  
Legomsky considers that where issues surface frequently in an area of law then this 
favours specialisation.133 This is because the benefits of efficiency and cost saving are 
particularly elevated because it allows the adjudicator to arrive at results quicker having 
frequently dealt with similar issues. It also ensures consistency in the application of the law 
as a result of continuous exposure to how the specialist area of law should be influenced by 
changes in fact patterns.134  
Commentators also suggest that repetition can disfavour specialisation.135 This is because 
repetition can impair the court’s ability to attract high quality practitioners because the 
subject matter is considered monotonous and unstimulating.136 The negative effect on 
judicial recruitment is commonly regarded as a disadvantage of judicial specialisation.137 
The Senior Courts have cautioned that it may reduce the quality of judges.138 
Commentators speculate that, generally, specialised judges are accorded less prestige and 
status than judges who are generalists.139 This is because generalist judges are expected to 
demonstrate the intellect to be able to resolve disputes in a broad range of fields of the law.  
A more specialised court could be less appealing for a judge because may represent a less 
prestigious office140 and it offers less interesting and challenging work than the broader 
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array of issues a generalist judge may encounter.141 Posner acknowledges that monotonous 
jobs can generally be unfulfilling. He argues that the growth of judicial specialisation gives 
the judicial work a degree of “monotony previously found on assembly lines”.142 
H Repetition applied to commercial law 
In the context of commercial law, there will be minimal repetition. This is because of how 
broad the jurisdiction of the area of commercial law is proposed to be defined. The 
Ministry of Justice provided the Law Commission with statistics that show the number of 
cases that are heard within different fields of the High Court’s civil jurisdiction.143 These 
statistics are set out in the table below: 
TOTAL NATIONAL SAMPLE FOR 2010 
Case Category Total % 
Bill of Exchange Act 1908 1 0.42 
Breach of Fiduciary Obligation 3 1.27 
Breach of Statutory Duty 2 0.84 
Building Contract 2 0.84 
Citizenship Act 1977 2 0.84 
Companies Act 1993 19 8.02 
Construction 1 0.42 
Consumer Guarantees 1 0.42 
Contract 35 14.77 
Copyright 2 0.84 
Damage to Property 2 0.84 
Declaration 1 0.42 
Defamation 1 0.42 
Department of Social Welfare 7 2.95 
Enforcement of Judgment 1 0.42 
Fair Trading Act 1986 17 7.17 
Family 5 2.11 
Guarantee 1 0.42 
Incorporated Societies Act 1908 1 0.42 
Insolvency Act 2006 3 1.27 
Insurance 4 1.69 
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Land Act 1948 1 0.42 
Leaky Building Claim 17 7.17 
Lease 3 1.27 
Mäori Customary Law 1 0.42 
Maritime Transport Act 1994 1 0.42 
Mortgage 2 0.84 
Negligence 12 5.06 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 3 1.27 
Partnership Act 1908 1 0.42 
Property 4 1.69 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 1 0.42 
Public Works Act 1981 2 0.84 
Resource Management Act 1991 1 0.42 
Sale & Purchase 9 3.80 
Tax 9 3.80 
Tort 2 0.84 
Trust 10 4.22 
Trustee Act 1956 3 1.27 
Unit Titles Act 2010   1 0.42 
(blank) 43 18.14 
 
The Law Commission has expressed its concern at the possible inaccuracy of these 
numbers.144 Nevertheless, they help illustrate the point that there would be minimal 
repetition in a specialist commercial court. This is because it is difficult to perceive of any 
of the above areas of the High Court’s civil jurisdiction that would not be able to satisfy 
the proposed jurisdiction of a commercial court. Therefore, a commercial judge will 
adjudicate a broad variety of cases. The most likely area of commercial law that may 
provide some repetition is contract-related cases at 14% of the court’s total civil workload 
for 2010. 
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I Criterion 5: Degree of controversy  
When the subject-matter of a decision is controversial then this should disfavour 
specialisation.145 Controversy may arise from the decision maker having discretion in 
deciding matters of vital public importance. It may also arise as a result of the decision 
having highly emotional content.146 Controversy is said to disfavour specialisation because 
specialisation risks undue concentration of power and bias by the specialised court as a 
result of insularity.147 Moreover, Legomsky argues that the public acceptability of having a 
specialist court will be aggravated where the issues are emotionally charged.148 
On the other hand, in some circumstances, matters of controversy should favour 
specialisation. This is because there could be areas of the law where the public will be 
more accepting of a controversial decision of a specialist court as opposed to a 
controversial decision of a generalist court. In the business context, a controversial 
decision by a commercial specialist court may be more palatable by the business 
community because they arguably have greater confidence in the capabilities of 
commercial specialist judges.149 
J Degree of controversy applied to commercial law 
High degrees of controversy will generally disfavour specialisation. However, this 
criterion does not disfavour specialisation in the context of commercial law. There are 
areas of commercial law that involve adjudication over particularly controversial subject 
matter. Two examples are decisions in the context of intellectual property and insolvency. 
However, the degree of controversy is not relatively higher in commercial law than the 
degree of controversy in other areas of law. Moreover, the disadvantages of specialisation 
due to the adjudication of controversial subject matter are less pronounced in commercial 
law because of the broad nature of the jurisdiction. 
Intellectual property involves the adjudication of controversial subject matter. Glazebrook 
J argues that because the area of patent law is developing so quickly, it is likely to be 
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controversial.150 This will particularly be the case in areas such as methods of medical 
treatment, computer software, business method, genetic material and genetically modified 
animals and plants.151 Insolvency decisions will deal with controversial and emotionally 
charged subject matter. This is commonly the case where the court has to adjudicate on the 
distribution of assets to creditors where there are minimal assets to satisfy all claims.152 In 
both of these examples, if there was a specialised intellectual property court, or insolvency 
court then there is a risk that this would create a perception that the specialist court was 
biased in favour of certain litigants. Accordingly, this would tend to disfavour 
specialisation. 
However, because the jurisdiction of the commercial court is so broad, the controversy of 
particular decisions within that jurisdiction does not disfavour specialisation. This is 
because the perception of bias would be much weaker as a result of the commercial judges 
adjudicating such a wide variety of cases. It would be less likely that they appear biased to 
certain litigants because they will not solely adjudicate that subject matter.  
K Criterion 6: Clannishness 
The ‘clannishness’ of a specialised community will not favour specialisation. When 
Legomsky discusses ‘clannishness’ he refers to the close/closed working relationship that 
the lawyers, government officials and expert witnesses have with one another.153 It is true, 
that to superimpose specialist adjudicators on top of these relationships would not be 
beneficial. This is because the closed nature of the group could give rise to disadvantages 
of specialisation such as preventing the cross-fertilisation of ideas and the stifling of 
innovation.154 Clannishness may have the advantage of enhancing efficiency due to the 
close working relationships between the parties. However, on balance clannishness should 
favour generalist adjudication. 
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L Clannishness applied to commercial law 
Clannishness is unlikely to be present in a commercial court. The broad jurisdiction 
prevents close working relationships between members of a particular profession, the 
litigants, the lawyers and the judges. The number of judges who will occupy the 
commercial panel has not yet been decided.155 There are currently nine High Court judges 
that occupy the commercial list in New Zealand.156 This number of judges sitting in a 
specialised commercial court or panel should not raise concerns from the perspective of 
increasing the risk of clannishness. Accordingly, this factor tends to support specialisation 
in commercial law. 
M Criterion 7: Peculiar importance of consistency 
There are some areas of law that have a peculiar importance of consistency. Where this is 
the case then judicial specialisation is favourable.157 Consistency can be particularly 
important in areas of law that require long term planning necessitating a high degree of 
certainty and predictability. It can also be especially important in a highly competitive 
industry where unequal treatment of parties results in one party being severely 
disadvantaged.158 This criterion supports specialisation because specialisation can promote 
consistency.159 
N Consistency applied to commercial law 
Commercial law does give rise to circumstances where competition within an industry 
magnifies the importance of consistency. Where this is the case, inconsistent application of 
the law can compound the practical effects of its application. An example of this is 
provided by Legomsky in the context of competition law. He posits that if one restaurant is 
granted a liquor licence and another restaurant within a close distance of the first is denied 
one, the latter restaurant is worse off than if both had been denied a licence.160 The 
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favouring of one business could in a competitive setting compound the disfavour shown to 
another business in similar circumstances. However, this will only be the case in a limited 
area of commercial law for example: licencing arrangements; intellectual property; and 
competition law. In the vast majority of commercial cases there will not be a peculiar 
importance of consistency. 
O Criterion 8: Dynamism 
A high degree of dynamism in the relevant area of law will support specialisation.161 
Dynamism describes an area of law that contains a rapidly changing subject matter. This 
includes frequent change of the legal substance as well as evolving technologies and 
theories that inform the factual matrix of a decision.162 Dynamism favours specialisation 
because the judges will be less likely to miss recent developments in the law and will be 
more efficient because they do not require extensive research or further explanation from 
counsel.163  
P Dynamism applied to commercial law 
There are a number of areas of commercial law where science and technology develop 
quickly, and as a consequence, so too does the law. Intellectual property often involves the 
adjudication of disputes concerning rights over property such as computer software, 
genetic material and medical treatment.164 The law therefore is subject to constant change 
based on the development of scientific and technological thinking.165 The International Bar 
Association recognised that intellectual property rights laws are subject to constant 
evolution and this supports the argument that there should be further specialisation in 
intellectual property law.166 Resource management commonly involves the analysis of 
scientific evidence concerning geology and contamination. Adjudication of disputes 
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involving the members of the electricity, telecommunications and transport sectors also 
requires a high degree of scientific analysis. It is likely that commercial law satisfies this 
criterion in a number of circumstances therefore leans towards specialisation. 
Q Criterion 9: Case volume/demand 
The volume of cases in the specialist area of law must be sufficient to justify 
specialisation.167 Additionally, the caseload of the generalist court currently dealing with 
the proposed specialist subject matter is relevant. If the caseload of the generalist court is 
minimal, then the advantages of efficiency of a specialist court are less applicable.168 
However, if the generalist court has a strained case load, then a specialist court can become 
more favourable.169 Similarly, future case load must be considered. It may be that an area 
of law will not maintain a high case load. For example, that particular area of law could 
experience a temporary influx of litigation that will reduce later. If this is the case, then a 
generalist court is better placed to deal with fluctuations in case load relating to different 
areas of law. Alternatively, there may be future legislation coming into force that is going 
to greatly increase the future litigation workload in an area of law.170  
The New Zealand Law Commission placed a heavy emphasis on case volume in the New 
Zealand context.171 The primary reason for this is New Zealand’s size and limited resource. 
The Commission commented that in London the case for a dedicated commercial court is 
stronger because the volume of commercial cases in the United Kingdom is much greater 
than in New Zealand. Where this is the case, it is easier to justify committing greater 
resource to setting up a specialist court.172 
R Case volume/demand applied to commercial law 
In the context of commercial law, there are two questions that must be answered in order to 
effectively apply this criterion. First, whether there is currently sufficient commercial 
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litigation to justify setting up a commercial court due to the workload of the current court 
dealing with commercial disputes. Secondly, whether further judicial specialisation would 
see continued high volume or growth of the volume of commercial cases in the future. The 
answer to both of these questions is inconclusive and more empirical study needs to be 
conducted before the application of this criterion can be concluded upon. 
The Law Commission has addressed the question of what the current commercial case 
volume is in the High Court. It discovered that this question is not easy to answer given the 
difficulties that arise as a result of the High Court’s or the Ministry of Justice’s case 
reporting.173 The reporting distinguishes broadly between criminal and civil proceedings. 
However, it fails to describe the underlying nature of the type of “civil proceeding”.174 This 
makes it difficult to determine what claims that fall within the scope of “civil”, also fall 
within the scope of “commercial”. The Ministry of Justice provided the Law Commission 
with a sample breakdown of physical court files of 95 cases in the Wellington and 
Auckland High Court registries from between 2008 and 2010.175 It was able to break down 
civil trials into case categories including breach of contract, Companies Act 1993, 
insolvency and copyright.176 However, these statistics did not give the Commission a 
comparison with other case volumes, which would enable them to conclude on how high 
the commercial case volume has been in the High Court. It can be concluded that civil 
proceedings make up a significant percentage of the High Court’s workload. The High 
Court’s annual report for 2013 listed that civil trials make up 62% of the case volume,177 
but as discussed above, there is no way of knowing what percentage of civil proceedings 
would be considered within the proposed commercial jurisdiction. 
The District Court statistics are equally inconclusive. The District Court annual report for 
2013 recorded 622 new defended civil cases for the 2013 period, down from 1,708 in the 
same period for 2009.178 Prima facie, this suggests that the civil workload of the District 
Court is low due to a 63% decrease over the past four years. However, similar to the High 
Court statistics, it is impossible to know the volume of commercial cases that make up the 
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civil statistics. Moreover, these statistics only provide the “defended” civil trial volume. 
There is no mention of the volume of civil claims filed, which would be a more helpful 
indicator of case volume as it would include claims that go through the pre-trial procedures 
but settle before the hearings.  
Therefore, it is difficult to conclude whether the current commercial case volume justifies 
judicial specialisation. It is clear that the civil workload of the District Court and the High 
Court is significant. It is also clear that the proposed commercial jurisdiction is 
significantly broad and should make up a large amount of the civil cases heard by the 
relevant generalist courts. However, until further empirical analysis is conducted on the 
underlying nature of civil proceedings in the District Court and High Court, this paper 
cannot conclude on the application of this criterion. 
The second question on the future case load of a commercial specialist court is similarly 
speculative. The Law Commission suggests that there has been a decrease in the High 
Court’s commercial case load as a result of an increase in the use of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR).179 Furthermore, it speculates that commercial specialisation may result 
in more cases being heard in the High Court instead of being diverted to ADR.180 On this 
analysis, it can be argued that commercial specialisation could increase the case volume of 
a commercial specialist court in the future. However, William Steel criticises this 
conclusion based on a distinct lack of empirical evidence that demonstrates there has been, 
first, an increase in the use of ADR and, secondly, evidence that develops a causal link 
between the increase in ADR and the High Court’s generalist structure.181 The primary 
reason for this appears to be that there no central dispute resolution body to collate or 
produce any meaningful ADR statistics.182 
S Criterion 10: Special need for prompt resolution 
If the area of law requires a special need for a prompt resolution of the legal dispute then 
this will favour specialisation. Legomsky’s main example is areas of law where there is an 
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incentive to file frivolous actions in order to delay or prevent a litigant from achieving an 
outcome which they may be entitled to.183 The need for prompt resolution is favourable to 
specialisation because specialisation can increase efficiency therefore reduce the time it 
takes to adjudicate time sensitive disputes.184 The Law Commission indicated that there is 
increasing criticism over the time taken for litigants to have disputes resolved using the 
court system.185 Advocates of judicial specialisation argue that the enhanced efficiency 
reduces the time delay for litigants and ultimately provides a more just outcome for those 
involved in the judicial system.186 
It is arguable that Legomsky’s example of areas of law that give rise to frivolous claims 
has been somewhat mitigated in the modern legal system. This is because the New Zealand 
Courts have been granted powers to more effectively deal with vexatious litigants. 
Recently, the Judicature Modernisation Bill proposes to further increase the ability of all 
Courts to make orders restricting vexatious litigant’s ability to continue to file frivolous 
claims.187  
T Prompt resolution applied to commercial law 
Commercial law does contain situations where there is a need for a prompt resolution but, 
it does not raise a special need for a prompt resolution. This is generally the case where a 
property right or reputational harm is at stake. Shinohara considers that one of the three 
major needs in an intellectual property dispute is an expedient trial.188 One reason for this 
is because intellectual property disputes can involve rapidly evolving subject matter. 
Another example is where a party is seeking the enforcement of a judgement to pay a debt 
in circumstances where the counter-party may move the relevant money off-shore. 
However, in the author’s view commercial law does not raise a special need for a prompt 
resolution. In most cases a party will have various mechanisms available to it to speed up 
their hearing. In an intellectual property dispute, the court can order an injunction 
preventing a party from taking action that it may be unjustified in taking. In a debt 
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collection case, the court can issue freezing orders and conduct ex-parte hearings where 
there is time sensitivity. 
U Criterion 11: Required special court procedures 
Finally, if an area of law requires unique court procedures then this will favour 
specialisation. This can be present where there are complex rules of litigation, or the 
litigation frequently includes multiple parties to a dispute.189 Specialist procedures offer 
flexibility for the specialist court to tailor procedures that suit the profile of litigants they 
deal with. This can save time, cost, enhance efficiency and improve that area of law’s 
competitive advantage. The reason why this criterion favours specialisation is because 
judicial specialisation enhances procedural efficiency. Procedural efficiency can be 
improved by setting up specialist procedures in a court’s case management systems that are 
designed to deal with the peculiarities of the particular specialist field of law.  
V Special court procedures applied to commercial law 
Commercial law gives rise to the need for special court procedures. This is illustrated by 
the establishment of the commercial list. The purpose of the commercial list is to provide a 
service to the commercial community by enabling commercial disputes to be decided as 
quickly and cheaply as the circumstances allow.190 It is comprised of a list of High Court 
judges who are considered commercial law specialists191 and it is intended that it speed up 
the pre-trial stages of proceedings relating to eligible matters.192 Members of the list are 
empowered to give “such directions as [they] think fit for the speedy and inexpensive 
determination of the real questions between the parties.”193 The special procedures that the 
list establishes seek to confine discovery processes to relevant matters, eliminate 
unnecessary pleadings, and grant the judge the discretion to take all necessary steps at the 
interlocutory stage of trial to minimise cost and reduce delay.194 The drivers behind the 
establishment of special procedures are the goals of saving time and achieving flexibility 
for commercial litigants.  
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IV Commercial specialisation conclusion 
Prima facie, Legomsky’s modified criteria support commercial specialisation. However, 
one problem with this conclusion, that is manifest in the application of most of the criteria, 
is the broad nature of what can be considered a “commercial case”. It seems that the 
proposed jurisdiction of a commercial court is so broad that it means any case that 
essentially has a “commercial flavour”.195 This is an issue because it is not hard to find 
specific arguments as to how each of the criteria could apply either for or against 
commercial specialisation. The result is that the criteria frequently raise examples in the 
areas of tax, competition law and intellectual property that supported specialisation. Other 
areas such as torts, contract and company law tended to disfavour specialisation, which are 
the areas of commercial law that have the highest volume of cases.196 In the author’s view, 
this problem would be alleviated by analysing the establishment of a more tightly defined 
jurisdiction such as an intellectual property court or a tax court. 
V Administrative law 
The next section of this paper will apply the criteria to the question of whether New 
Zealand should have further judicial specialisation in the area of administrative law. 
Currently, the New Zealand High Court exercises the jurisdiction to hear appeals from 
administrative tribunals on matters relating to administrative law.197 This has not always 
been the case. From 1968 through until 1991 there was an administrative division of the 
High Court that exercised this jurisdiction.198 The administrative division was abolished in 
1991.199 The area of administrative law has been chosen because it has been suggested as 
an area of specialisation in the past and it offers a contrast to issues that are raised by the 
application of the criteria to commercial law. As is the case in commercial law, there is a 
global trend towards having specialist administrative courts. The most relevant 
jurisdictions to New Zealand that have followed this global trend include the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, which both have their own dedicated 
administrative court to hear administrative law appeals. 
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In 1968 the Administrative Division of the Supreme Court (as it was then) was established. 
It was established as a result of recommendations from the Public and Administrative Law 
Reform Committee (PALRC), which recommended its establishment in order to bring 
some order to the system of appeals from administrative tribunals.200 In 1991 the 
Judicature Amendment Act201 abolished the operation of the Administrative Division and 
transferred the jurisdiction to hear appeals from administrative tribunals back to the High 
Court. The repeal was prompted by a Law Commission report, which, for a number of 
reasons discussed below, recommended the Division’s abolition.202 
The global trend towards specialisation in administrative law is apparent in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. In the United Kingdom, the Queen’s Bench Division of 
the High Court of Justice of England and Wales is home to the specialist Administrative 
Court. This court consists of the administrative law jurisdiction of England and Wales as 
well as a supervisory jurisdiction over inferior courts and tribunals.203 The supervisory 
jurisdiction mainly consists of judicial review.204 In the United States, the Administrative 
Procedure Act 1946 provides for the appointment of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). 
ALJs preside over trials and adjudicate claims involving the application of administrative 
law.  
A Discretion, law or fact 
Legomsky uses administrative law as an example of how this criterion can apply. He 
comments that the application of this criterion exposes the difficulty of viewing 
administrative law “monolithically”.205 As will be seen below, administrative law contains 
examples of requiring adjudication to deal with questions of discretion, law and fact. This 
is a result of having such a wide variety of bodies dealing with discrete executive 
functions, which can be appealed for adjudication by the courts.  
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Adjudication in administrative law can involve questions of discretion. In some fields of 
administrative law there is said to be a “prevalence of policy questions”.206 The minority 
view in the PALRP Report advocated for greater specialisation in administrative law 
because the powers likely to be vested in an administrative court would “involve value 
judgments on matters of social or economic policy”.207 Decisions from many 
administrative tribunals will primarily be concerned with questions of law. Examples of 
tribunals where this is the case for appeals include: the Accident Compensation Appeals 
Authority,208 the Alcohol Regulatory and Licencing Authority,209 the Copyright 
Tribunal,210 the Immigration and Protection Tribunal211 and the Real Estate Agents 
Disciplinary Tribunal.212 In each of these cases the appeals from various tribunals and 
authorities are statutorily restricted to questions of law. On the other hand, there are 
tribunal decisions and appeals that are heavily concerned with questions of fact. 
Commentators cite the Land Valuation Tribunal as a tribunal that deals primarily in fact 
questions.213 In particular, Legomsky posits that fact questions “typify the land valuation 
cases”.214  
B Complexity 
Administrative law frequently deals with technically complex legal and factual subject-
matter. Sir Robin Cooke described the subject-matter of administrative law as 
“difficult”.215 Legomsky considers administrative law to be an area of high complexity.216 
He points to the issues that judges have to grapple with in welfare cases or liquor licence 
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cases, which often raise similar technical problems to those encountered in “technical trade 
cases, scientifically technical patent cases, or financially technical securities cases”.217 
Numerous leading texts on administrative law, from various jurisdictions, assert the 
complexity of administrative law is a result of its interaction with innumerable aspects of 
political, commercial and private life.218  
On the other hand, one of the primary reasons why the PALRC recommended against a 
separate specialist administrative court is because of its complexity. It commented that the 
nature of appellate work in administrative law demanded the legal qualifications of 
generalist judges.219 There was no further discussion as to why this is the case, however, 
this could be because, in appellate administrative law decisions, judges have to grapple 
with a much wider variety of legal issues. This is reflective of the broad array of 
administrative tribunals that deal with anything from licencing to charities registration to 
accident compensation issues. 
This is an interesting illustration of how this criterion can be either supportive of or negate 
arguments for a specialist court. Perhaps a distinction should be drawn between complexity 
of the subject matter and the complexity of the legal questions raised. Where the subject 
matter is complex, as is illustrated in taxation and intellectual property, then this will 
support specialisation. However, the complexity of legal decision making should support a 
generalist jurisdiction due to the enhanced exposure generalist judges have to a broad 
manner of legal issues.  
C Isolation 
The jurisdiction of an administrative court is easily isolated with minimal cross over in 
considering other areas of law. In 1964 Orr produced a report (the Orr Report) 
recommending the establishment of an Administrative Court in New Zealand. It proposed 
that the jurisdiction of the Court should include most appellate functions of the High Court 
and District Courts (then Supreme Court and Magistrate’s Court respectively) in respect of 
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tribunals and other administrative authorities.220 It later recommended that the jurisdiction 
of the proposed Court should be extended to appeals from some decisions of officials and 
administrative authorities other than tribunals.221 The PALRC Report recommended a 
similar jurisdiction to the Orr Report, however, in addition it recommended that the court 
be granted the general supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court (the Supreme Court) to 
review “administrative adjudication”.222 
D Degree of repetition 
There is some degree of repetition in administrative law decisions. This repetition is 
manifest in the similarities of legal issues that come before an administrative decision-
maker. Issues such as: when is procedural fairness in adjudication required and, 
additionally, what does it require when it is? What are the particular procedures that certain 
administrative bodies must follow when they craft rules? What is the scope of judicial 
review and appeal?223  
Within the substance of administrative law there will be particular fields that will raise 
similar fact patterns. For example, appeals or the review of decisions from the Accident 
Compensation Appeal Authority will often allow a judge to draw on factual analogies from 
cases dealt with in the past, in deciding whether a certain claim for compensation is 
legitimate. Similarly, appeals from the Taxation Review Authority will enforce the 
efficiency gains for a judge who is frequently confronted with taxation questions. 
However, this observation to an extent is impractical because it relies on administrative 
judges concentrating on particular administrative tribunal appeals. The problem with this is 
that there are 30 major administrative tribunals listed on the Ministry of Justice’s website 
and many more that go unmentioned.224 Currently, there are only 47 High Court judges 
available for sitting in the High Court’s generalist jurisdiction.225 There would not be 
enough judges to dedicate each of their time only to appeals from certain tribunals. 
Accordingly, specialist judges would have to deal with appeals from a wide variety of 
tribunals, substantially decreasing the degree of repetition. 
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E Degree of controversy 
More so than commercial law, administrative law involves the adjudication of cases that 
involve a high degree of controversy. Controversial decisions arise in the context of 
administrative law because it is concerned with the judicial oversight of the executive.226 
The primary powers of public authorities are statutory, and administrative law concerns the 
courts invoking their “constitutional warrant to superintend” the exercise of such power.227 
It can be perceived as particularly controversial because it often concerns cases where 
there has been a possible abuse of power. The judicial review powers of the High Court 
have been described as enabling the judiciary to “operate as a bulwark against the abuse of 
power”.228 The House of Lords have described administrative law as providing remedies 
“invented by the judges to restrain the excess or abuse of power”.229 
Controversial administrative law decisions in New Zealand include: the illegality of an 
announcement by the New Zealand Prime Minister,230 judicial review of the decision to 
grant overseas investment consent to a Chinese company to purchase a large New Zealand 
dairy farm,231 judicial review into a police search of an investigative journalist’s home 
following the release of a political book criticising the government,232 application for 
judicial review of the Justice Minister’s refusal to grant an individual, who was acquitted 
from a murder charge, compensation233 or a failed application for the judicial review of the 
Hamilton Council’s decision to fluoridate Hamilton’s water supply due to alleged negative 
health impacts.234 
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F Clannishness 
Clannishness is unlikely to be present in administrative law for similar reasons to why this 
criterion was not applicable to commercial law. The broad array of administrative tribunals 
and decision-makers from which appeals can be brought, prevents any unhealthy 
relationships between the lawyers, tribunals and judges in an administrative court. 
However, if it was suggested that the judges within the administrative court should be 
assigned to hear cases only from tribunals that they have experience in dealing with, then 
the risk of clannishness would be much higher.  
G Peculiar importance of consistency 
The peculiar importance of consistency in administrative law is limited. Consistency may 
be important in the context of adjudicating appeals or reviews from licencing authorities. 
This is for the same reasons as in the competition law context where inconsistency in the 
application of decision making power can have a compounded effect on those who are 
shown disfavour by a licencing authority. This would be the case in the issuance of liquor 
licences by the Alcohol Regulatory and Licencing Authority235 where one competitor 
would be severely disadvantaged if it was denied a licence and another nearby competitor 
was granted one under similar circumstances. 
H Dynamism 
This criterion also highlights why it is problematic to view public law monolithically. 
There are various areas of public law that are subject to constant change. This is manifest 
in administrative decisions regarding copyright, land valuation and planning and 
environmental tribunal decisions. These factual cases are influenced heavily by changes to 
the economy, technology and the advances of scientific theory.236 Other areas of 
administrative law may be subject to rapid change as a result of constant policy changes. 
This is likely going to be the case regarding disputes from tribunals such as the Social 
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Security Appeal Authority and the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority. However, 
there will also be areas of administrative law that are less dynamic.237 
I Case volume/demand 
There is an insufficient caseload in administrative law to justify further specialisation. One 
of the foremost reasons why the Law Commission recommended the abolition of the 
Administrative Division of the High Court in 1989 was because there were insufficient 
cases to justify a separate court.238 In 1989 there were 7 judges appointed to the division239 
and it was estimated that one tenth of the administrative law decisions were decided by 
non-Divisional judges.240 In 1991, Divisional Judges gave about 30 decisions a year with a 
low of 16 in 1975 and a high of 47 in 1984.241 It was thought that the case load of the 
Division was so low that it stunted any ability to grow the judge’s expertise in 
administrative law. Justice Holland illustrated this point where he stated “how does one 
acquire expertise in broadcasting law from two cases?”242 
The question, therefore, is whether the case volume of administrative appeals would have 
changed sufficiently since 1991. In the 12 months ending 30 June 2014, there were 183 
new judicial review cases brought before the High Court, and 97 remaining active as at 30 
June 2014.243 This is in the context of a total number of new cases in the High Court of 
7,147.244 Accordingly, administrative law cases comprised 2.6% of the High Court’s 
workload in 2014. It does not appear that the current number of administrative law cases is 
producing a considerable workload for the High Court to the extent that it would support 
the establishment of a separate administrative court or a specialist panel within the High 
Court.  
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J Special need for prompt resolution 
Administrative law is not a field of law that presents a pressing need for the prompt 
resolution of disputes relative to other fields of law. It could be argued that this particular 
field of law inherently takes longer to arrive at decision relative to others. This is because, 
often, if the administrative law appeal is successful, it is referred back to the original 
decision maker who is required to reconsider the decision based upon the ruling of the 
appellate court. This longer process does not appear to detriment plaintiffs because tribunal 
decisions are often of a nature that can be reversed retrospectively if it was found that the 
tribunal’s decision requires reversal.245 
K Required special court procedures 
There is a case to be made that administrative law necessitates special court procedures. 
The Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee regarded it implicit in its 
recommendation for an administrative division of the High Court that the “atmosphere [of 
the division] should not be more formal than that of… administrative tribunals”246 and that 
there “should be no bar to the appointment of lay members… to sit with the Court if and 
when desirable”.247 Once established, the Administrative Division Rules provided for 
special procedures for appeals to the division.248 The rules were described as “designedly 
less formal and freer from the technicalities which bedevil ordinary court proceedings”.249 
In part this is because of Rule 4, which provides that the rules are to be construed to ensure 
“the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any proceeding”.250 In the context of 
taking evidence, there is wide discretion for the manner it can be done.251 It may be taken 
“orally on oath or affirmation, or by affidavit, declaration or otherwise as the Court thinks 
fit”.252 
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Because a large majority of appeals in administrative law involve judicial review, the 
principle grounds upon which the court will review a decision maker’s decision are 
illegality, irrationality and procedural unfairness.253 This will often involve an assessment 
of the considerations to which a decision maker had regard to when arriving at its 
decision.254 The focus on the considerations to which a decision maker has regard to is 
viewed as peculiar to administrative law, necessitating a further special court procedure in 
the rules which provided for the court to direct a decision maker to lodge:255 
“a report setting out the considerations to which it had regard to in making the order 
of decision, including any material indicating the effect that the order or decision 
might have on the general administration of the enactment under which the order or 
decision was made, and any other matters relevant to the order or decision or to the 
general administration of the enactment to which it wishes to draw the attention of 
the court.” 
It is therefore apparent that administrative law is a field of law that can be adjudicated 
more effectively if there are special court procedures.  
VI Administrative law conclusion 
An overwhelming majority of the criteria support further specialisation in administrative 
law at the appellate court level, however, the lack of case volume has the effect of 
overriding all of the supportive criteria and undermining the case for further specialisation. 
Support is gleaned from the prevalence of discretionary and factual decisions, the 
complexity of the subject matter, the ease at which the jurisdiction can be isolated, the 
repetition of legal and factual questions, its dynamism and the requirement for special 
court procedures. These were all supporting factors that the PALRC originally highlighted 
either explicitly or implicitly when recommending the establishment of an administrative 
division in 1968.256 They are just as prevalent (if not more prevalent as discussed above) 
today as they were in 1968.  
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Nevertheless, the presence of those factors alone was not enough to support the 
maintenance of the administrative division which was abolished in 1991.257 The primary 
reason was insufficient case load/demand. This is an interesting observation because nearly 
all of Legomsky’s other criteria supported the maintenance of an administrative division in 
the High Court but they were all overridden by the lack of workload for the division. Upon 
analysis of the present statistics involving case workload of the High Court there is still 
insufficient workload in administrative law to justify further specialisation at the appellate 
level. Therefore, in the current New Zealand environment, there is not sufficient support 
for further specialisation in administrative law at the appellate court level. 
VII Summary of application of criteria to commercial law and 
administrative law 
The application of the criteria can broadly be summarised in the table set out below. Each 
criterion is ranked on the degree of presence it manifests within that particular field of law 
based on the analysis above.  
Criterion Support/oppose 
specialisation 
Commercial Law Administrative 
Law 
Criterion 1 -  Discretionary decision-
making 
Support High presence High presence 
Legal decision-making Oppose High presence Medium presence 
Factual decision-making Support Medium presence Medium presence 
Criterion 2 - Complexity Support High presence High presence 
Criterion 3 – Isolation Support Low presence High presence 
Criterion 4 – Repetition Support Low presence Medium presence 
Criterion 5 – Controversy  Oppose Medium presence High presence 
Criterion 6 - Clannishness Oppose Low presence Low presence 
Criterion 7 – Peculiar importance of 
consistency 
Support Medium presence Low presence 
Criterion 8 – Dynamism Support High presence Medium presence 
Criterion 9 – Case workload Support Inconclusive Low presence 
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Criterion 10 – Special need for a prompt 
resolution 
Support Medium presence Low presence 
Criterion 11 – Required special court 
procedures  
Support High presence High presence 
 
It is immediately apparent most criteria that are supportive of specialisation manifest 
themselves in some way in both commercial and administrative law. Both areas have a 
high degree of complexity, which, as mentioned above, is often cited as a significant factor 
that favours specialisation. It is also interesting that both fields of law have a high / 
medium presence of legal decision making and controversy, which oppose specialisation. 
Each area of law seems to differ significantly on the application of criterion 3, which 
assess the ability of the specialist court to isolate the jurisdiction. The primary reason for 
this seems to how wide the Law Commission proposed the jurisdiction of the Commercial 
List to be. This had the effect of making it near impossible to isolate the court’s 
jurisdiction as opposed to the ease at which you can isolate the jurisdiction of an 
administrative court.  
Importantly, case workload had a low presence in administrative law and was inconclusive 
in commercial law. If it was concluded that case workload was equally low in commercial 
law then it would be likely that this would undermine any support for further 
specialisation. Therefore, it is imperative that more statistical work needs to be undertaken 
on the caseload of the High Court before an informed decision can be made on further 
specialisation in commercial law.    
VIII Interaction of Legomsky’s criteria 
Having applied the criteria to commercial law and administrative law, two observations 
can be made about the interaction of the criteria as a whole. The first observation identifies 
the problem of viewing the particular area of law monolithically, which the application of 
the criteria demands. The second observation suggests that the criteria should be weighted 
so as to recognise that each criterion carries a different level of influence.  
The first observation that is apparent in applying the criteria as a whole to commercial law 
and administrative law is that they require the areas of law to be viewed monolithically and 
indivisible. Each criterion is aimed at assessing whether the specific area “as a whole” 
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manifests the certain attributes of that specific criterion. This has proved problematic in the 
case of both commercial law and administrative law because they are not monolithic 
subject areas. Commercial law is comprised of a plethora of sub-areas of law including 
taxation, intellectual property, insolvency, bankruptcy, contract and resource management. 
Similarly administrative law is comprised of assessing the exercise of executive power in 
respect of many different tribunals and executive decision makers. The various tribunals 
include the Copyright Tribunal, Taxation Review Authority, Tenancy Tribunal, Legal Aid 
Tribunal, Waitangi Tribunal and the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority to name a 
few. 
Consequentially, in applying each criterion, there are examples that support specialisation 
and equally examples that oppose specialisation. For example, in the context of applying 
the criterion of consistency to commercial law and administrative law there were discrete 
cases within the fields of law that required a special need for consistency such as 
competition law adjudication, and licencing decisions. However, viewed as a whole it is 
hard to say that commercial law or administrative law requires a special need for 
consistency. Dynamism in the context of commercial law is present for adjudication 
regarding resource management, taxation and intellectual property but not for other areas 
such as insolvency. Similarly, when applying repetition to administrative law, there is 
repetition of facts and legal issues in appeals from discrete tribunals but administrative law 
is not particularly repetitious as a whole.  
One of the reasons why the application of the criteria produces problems when viewing 
commercial law and administrative law monolithically could be because the criteria were 
designed by an academic from the United States of America. The United States is a legal 
system that has effected judicial specialisation in the sub areas of both commercial law and 
administrative law. In commercial law there is a United States Tax Court, Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board, International Trade Commission, United States Court of International Trade 
and United States Bankruptcy Court.258 Administrative law courts include the Court of 
Federal Claims, Court of Appeals for Federal Claims and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review.259 Legomsky may have been influenced by such a high degree of 
specialisation in the United States where the criteria could be applied much more easily 
due to the discreetness of subject matter that the criteria would be applied to. However, in 
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New Zealand this degree of specialisation would not be practicable. New Zealand us under 
much greater resource constraints and does not have the case volume of the United States. 
The second observation is that the criteria cannot carry equal weight. There are some 
criteria that are significantly more influential than others. This is clearly illustrated by the 
influence that a low case volume has had on the question of whether New Zealand should 
have further specialisation in administrative law. In the context of commercial 
specialisation, case volume was a significant factor assessed by the Law Commission when 
making its recommendation for a Commercial List, whereas, the question of repetition was 
not mentioned once. 260 Accordingly, it would be helpful to identify the criteria that carry 
significant weight and the criteria that are less influential in deciding whether further 
specialisation is necessary. 
Based on the application of Legomsky’s criteria to commercial law and administrative law, 
it appears that in the New Zealand context case volume/demand is the most important 
criterion. If there is insufficient case volume to justify specialisation then it is highly 
unlikely that specialisation will occur. Technical complexity and dynamism both seem to 
be factors that also carry a high degree of influence when considering specialisation. Every 
submission received to the recent Law Commission Issues Paper on commercial 
specialisation, which supported specialisation, cited complexity and dynamism as reasons 
why further specialisation should be effected.261 The requirement for special court 
procedures in some circumstances will carry significant weight. In the context of 
establishing the Family Court in New Zealand, the Royal Commission on Courts placed 
heavy emphasis on the need maintain special Family Court procedures in order to provide 
a “conciliation service”.262  
On the other hand, the degree of controversy and clannishness seem less important 
considerations. Perhaps this is another reflection of a difference between New Zealand and 
the United States. The disadvantages of specialisation that inform these two criteria are 
primarily the risk of bias and apparent bias within the judiciary. It could be argued that the 
risk of bias in the United States is much greater due to the political role that judges play 
and the proliferation of lobbying in order to obtain political favour. These risks are less 
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present in the New Zealand judicial system. This could justify attaching less weight to 
these two criteria. Additionally the criterion in assessing whether the area of law has a 
special need for a prompt resolution is less influential. This is because in most cases parties 
will have legal mechanisms available to them that transcend specialist jurisdictions, which 
are designed to speed up hearings or provide relief when legal proceedings are time 
sensitive. These procedures include injunctions, ex parte hearings and freezing orders. 
IX Conclusion 
This paper has been a contribution to the debate on judicial specialisation. It is important 
that this debate is given careful consideration because it is a question that will increasingly 
face decision-makers in the future. The paper has contributed to the debate by offering a 
decision-maker a set of 11 criteria to apply when facing the question of whether to effect 
further judicial specialisation in any given area of law. These criteria can help form a 
template that, upon application, will draw out the issues with specialisation inherent in that 
given field of law. Taking a principled approach to the question of further specialisation 
has not been the practice of decision-makers to date.  
Perhaps, just as important as recognising what this paper has done, is the recognition of 
what this paper has not done. This paper has not provided a “magic formula” to a decision-
maker which can be applied in such a way so as to provide a definitive answer on 
specialisation. This is not possible because it requires an assessment of degrees and 
weightings, which can only be achieved making value judgements as to how the criteria 
interact.  This paper has also not assessed how the criteria might apply to further 
specialisation at the lower court level. As mentioned earlier, specialisation can be most 
beneficial at the initial trial level. Therefore, it would be highly beneficial for more 
research to be undertaken adapting the criteria to apply to lower courts and tribunals. 
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